This article describes a quantum bit commitment protocol, QBC3, based on entanglement destruction via forced measurements and proves its unconditional security. Some comments on the current status of the field are also made.
Introduction
It is nearly universally accepted that unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment (QBC) is impossible. For a summary of the problem, its brief history and further references, see [1, 2] . In the following, my current view of the field is summarized and a new secure protocol, QBC3, is presented together with a sketch of the security proof.
The Impossibility Proof
The general claim of impossibility was made in ref. [3, 4] and criticized in some detail in [1] and [5] . In my current understanding, there are two major gaps in the arguments supporting such claims. The first is the assumption that all use of (classical) randomness in the protocol can be purified via quantum entanglement that results in an openly known pure state for the parties A and B. The second is that any quantum measurement specified in the middle of protocol execution can be postponed to the end of commitment just before opening. These two points are related, and both connected to the implicit assumption that entanglement can be formed and maintained to just before opening.
The first assumption is clearly false by noting that entanglement has to end at some point, at which the entanglement basis and probabilities can still be determined by random numbers. Such numbers may be physically generated classically or quantum mechanically, say by throwing a die or heterodyning the vacuum. They are needed in many classical and all quantum cryptographic protocols. There is no need for the basis and probabilities to be known to the other party if his/her security is not affected -we have codified this as the Secrecy Principle [5, 1] . In particular, this does not violate the Kerckhoff's Principle, which states that the adversary is presumed to know the structure of the protocol in cryptography. On the other hand, the "community" somehow thinks there is a violation according to ref. [2] .
Similar to the first, the second assumption is true in various types of protocols but not all. The crucial point is whether the relevant entanglement that is responsible for successful cheating by either A or B can be made or can remain effective after measurement in the middle of a protocol.
I have insisted, since the beginning in 2000, that a priori there can be no general impossibility proof without mathematically representing a common characteristic of all QBC protocols, which has never been given. As Ozawa put it, nobody calls the Church-Turing thesis the Church-Turing Conjecture or Theorem, because there is no mathematical definition of a mechanical procedure. It is difficult to understand on what basis one can claim to have a completely general impossibility theorem, as allegedly maintained by the vast majority of the 'community' at present [2] . Apparently, much remains to be written to explain just this point.
Exploiting Gaps in the Impossibility Proof
There have been many attempts by different authors to produce protocols that lie outside the impossibility proof formulation. Even when successful, a secure protocol has not been created except my QBC1 [1] . My own attempts are summarized in Appendix A of [1] and will be updated in the future. One of the reasons that error is easily committed in the QBC problem is conceptual -how one should represent certain given physical action mathematically. Indeed, I believe this act/math correspondence is a fruitful area for future exploration that would not only lead to a more systematic understanding of all possible protocol formulations and attacks in QBC, but in the foundation of quantum physics generally.
More general proofs of impossibility relaxing the first assumption have been given by Ozawa [6] and Cheung [7] independently, and also by D'Ariano etc [2] in an algebraic formulation that has not been translated into the standard form. While it is claimed in [2] that their formulation covers all my previous protocols, it is not true for QBC1.
Protocol QBC3
My current QBC3 is similar to a previous QBC3 I had that is not secure, its security now derives from an added feature from B's checking before opening which forces A to make a measurement that destroys his cheating entanglement. Consider the following protocol: B sends A a sequence of n qubits, each randomly in one of the four BBS4 states |j l , j e ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, named by its position in the sequence. A randomly picks one, modulates it by U 0 = R(π/16) or U 1 = R(−π/16), rotation by ±π/16 on the great circle containing {|j } depending on b ∈ {0, 1}, and sends it back to B as commitment. A opens by sending back the rest and revealing everything. This is a typical preliminary protocol in that it is at best ǫ-concealing with A's optimum cheating probability not correspondingly close to 1, so that in a sequence of such action a single bit can be committed that is both ǫ-concealing and ǫ-binding. For definitions and terminology, see [1] .
This protocol was first given as an anonymous state protocol in which B entangles her randomness with arbitrary probability and basis, but it was found, as asserted above, that A's cheating transformation is actually independent of such information. There are many ways for A to entangle and it is claimed in [2] that the one with the minimum ancilla state-space dimension is as good as any [2] . Let |l ∈ H A be the entanglement ancilla states, P 1l the unitary operator exchanging |j 1 with the l-th qubit, P 11 = I. A's "best" entanglement is this case is
where |j 1 is acted on by U b . The protocol can be shown to be ǫ -concealing similar to the proof given in ref [8] , and A can locally turn |Ψ 0 to |Ψ 1 near perfectly.
Consider the following addition to the protocol. Before opening, B asks A to send back a fraction λ, say λ = 1 2 , of the n qubits chosen randomly by B for checking. One can choose n large enough so that n 2 is long enough for the ǫ concealing level. If A claims that fraction contains the committed one, B would ask to check the remaining 1 − λ fraction instead. Assuming, as usual, that A must open one bit value perfectly, A would have to answer B's checks perfectly. A continuity argument would take care of the general case. The best he can do is to perform a Luders measurement on his ancilla H A , projecting into the qubits complement to what B picked. If the checking qubits do not contain the committed qubit from the measurement result, which is then still entangled with the rest, A succeeds in cheating. If they do, A may fail to project into the right ancilla subspace and so disentangles the committed qubit from the rest, and entanglement cheating for A is no longer possible. Indeed, his cheating success probability is not small, given by 1/2 for λ = 1/2, while the protocol remains ǫ−concealing. This already contradicts the quantitative conclusion of the Impossibility Proof, for which A's cheating probability should be close to 1. The protocol is extended to be a near-perfect concealing and binding one, QBC3, as described generally in [1] and [9] , by adjusting the following m → ∞ with n/m → ∞.
PROTOCOL QBC3
1. B sends A m segments of n-qubits, each randomly in one of four BBS4 states.
2. A randomly picks one from each segment, modulates them by the same U b = R(±π/16) and sends them back to B.
3. B randomly chooses half of the qubits in each segment and asks A to send them back for checking. If for any segment A claims it contains the committed one, B asks to check the other half instead. When A is allowed to open not perfectly for both bits, a continuity argument may be applied to show security. Usually an honesty assumption is made, but even when either party is allowed to be found cheating, two ways were proposed before to deal with it quantitatively: by further ensemble checking or by a classical game-theoretic formulation -see the Appendix of ref [10] . It is clear that some decision has to made on what to do if A or B is found cheating, they cannot be allowed to go free or they could just keep cheating until the succeed. In the ensemble checking formulation, the first time a party is found cheating is taken as failure to cheat in the evaluation of their cheating success probability. For the game theoretic formulation, a penalty is assigned to each cheat detection and the total penalty is bounded. Another approach is to add a "holding phase" [2] between commitment and opening, during which cheating detection counts as failure to cheat. Such an approach was used in several of my early checking protocols [1, 9] . These different formulations are qualitatively equivalent, and a protocol is unconditionally secure under one formulation if it is under another. Note that the formulation in ref [2] does not include a checking action in the holding phase, and it does not include any penalty on cheat detection. Thus, it does not cover the present protocol QBC3, and my old QBC1.
There is yet an incompleteness in the above proof: it has not been shown that the entanglement (1) is optimum in a protocol with checking. Indeed, it may be shown that it is not for some checking situations. In lieu of a proof that (1) is the optimum entanglement, one may enforce that (1) be employed by A via B verifying the total state including the ancilla A is to send to her upon opening, such that half of the qubits be entangled in a form resulting from (1) as described above. In this way, a relatively simple but complete security proof has been given.
Conclusion
A protocol QBC3 with checking has been given that clearly lies outside the formulation of all the impossibility proofs. Apart from spelling out the details, all the essential elements for a complete security proof for QBC3 have been described. 
